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Abstract 
An apparently increasing number of philosophers take free will skepticism to pose a 
serious challenge to some of our practices.  This must seem odd to many—why should 
anyone think that free will skepticism is relevant for our practices, when nobody seems to 
think that other canonical forms of philosophical skepticism (for example, skepticism about 
induction or other minds) are relevant for our practices?  Part of the explanation may be 
epistemic, but here I focus on a metaethical explanation.  Free will skepticism is special 
because it is compatible with 'basic moral reasons'—moral reasons acknowledged by all 
mainstream ethicists—and other minds and induction skepticism are not.  One example is our 
reason not to intentionally harm others.  Practical seriousness about other minds and 
induction skepticism undermines this reason, but practical seriousness about free will 
skepticism only undermines a potential overrider of this reason, that is, the reason of 
retribution.   
1. Introduction
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Free will is the kind of control over our actions necessary for moral responsibility, 
and we must be morally responsible for our actions to deserve particular kinds of treatment 
based on them, such as praise, blame, reward, or punishment.  Until fairly recently, the most 
energetic debate in the free will literature was about whether free will was compatible with 
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determinism.  Just about everyone involved agreed that, one way or another, human beings 
did in fact have free will.  What they disagreed about was whether determinism could obtain 
along with free will.  But recent decades have seen influential contributions by free will 
skeptics such as Derk Pereboom, Saul Smilansky, and Galen Strawson.
2
  These philosophers 
differ in many ways, but they all endorse the view that I will refer to here as 'free will 
skepticism', that is, the view that we do not know that we have free will.  Some (e.g. 
Strawson and Smilansky) even endorse a stronger view—that we can know we lack free will.  
There are of course precedents for these views in the history of philosophy, but they are being 
argued with a renewed energy, and their implications for our practices (such as retributive 
punishment and distributive justice) are being studied in a new level of detail.  A small 
industry has grown up around the question of whether we ought to live differently in light of 
free will skepticism.  In this paper, I will call the view of philosophers who take this question 
seriously 'practical seriousness' about free will skepticism.  To be practically serious about a 
kind of philosophical skepticism is to accept that it is a live philosophical possibility that 
arguments for that kind of skepticism are relevant for practical reasoning.  (By 'relevant for 
practical reasoning', I mean relevant for reasoning about at least some actual behavior in the 
actual world, not merely relevant for how people act in merely possible worlds.)   
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Many philosophers, some within the free will subfield, and probably many more 
without, must find practical seriousness about free will skepticism perplexing.  Philosophers 
have long acknowledged that there are all kinds of fascinating and profound reasons for 
skepticism about many of our ordinary beliefs, for example, our beliefs that we can know that 
other minds exist, and that induction yields knowledge.  But philosophers have almost 
universally not thought these things to be worth dwelling on outside the study.  Experts on 
other minds or induction skepticism have never, to my knowledge, seriously suggested that 
these kinds of skepticism are relevant for practical reasoning.  If nobody is practically serious 
about these other forms of skepticism, then shouldn't we worry that people who are 
practically serious about free will skepticism are taking it too seriously?   
I think they are not taking it too seriously, because free will skepticism has a moral 
status which induction and other minds skepticism lack.  In this paper, I will not argue that 
free will skepticism is true, or even that we ought to be practically serious about it.  I will 
argue for more limited claims.  But let me define some terms before I set these claims out.  A 
moral reason is basic if all mainstream ethicists accept that we have it.  The central example, 
for purposes of this paper, is an extremely strong reason not to intentionally harm other 
people—a reason which I will refer to as 'H', to keep things concise.  To be committed to 
maintaining a reason is to have resolved to reject theory changes that 'downgrade' that reason 
(for example, changes that increase the incidence of its being overridden by other reasons).  
To be inclined to advance a reason is to be disposed to accept (all other things being equal) 
theory changes that 'upgrade' it (for example, changes that diminish the incidence of its being 
overridden by other reasons).  I will argue that if we are committed to maintaining H, then we 
can be practically serious about free will skepticism, but not other minds or induction 
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skepticism.
3
  I will go on to argue that if we are inclined to advance H, then we have good 
reason to become practically serious about free will skepticism.   
Before I begin, let me address some prefatory issues.   I don't have in mind principles 
that I take to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for determining whether a kind of 
skepticism is a kind of philosophical skepticism.  By 'kinds of philosophical skepticism' I 
mean only to refer to kinds which have found places in the canon of philosophy.  I take the 
kinds of skepticism mentioned thus far—induction skepticism, other minds skepticism, and 
free will skepticism—to be examples.  Induction skepticism is the view that induction does 
not yield knowledge, or, phrased differently, that we don't know the products of induction.  
Other minds skepticism is the view that we don't know that other minds exist.  Free will 
skepticism is the view that we don't know that we have free will. 
Some may think that the explanation of practical seriousness about free will 
skepticism lies in a special epistemic status, rather than a special moral status.  They may 
point out that some practically serious free will skeptics endorse not only the view I am 
calling free will skepticism in this paper—the view that we don't know we have free will—
but also the stronger view mentioned earlier—the view that we can know we lack free will.  
Things are different with respect to the other kinds of skepticism at issue.  To the best of my 
knowledge, no philosophers who endorse the weaker claim that we don't know other minds 
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exist also endorse the stronger claim that we know they don't exist, and no philosophers who 
endorse the weaker claim that we don't know inductively-generated claims to be true endorse 
the stronger claim that we know these claims to be false.  It makes sense to worry more about 
a claim presupposed by our practices if we take ourselves to know that it is false than if we 
merely take ourselves to lack knowledge of its truth.   
This difference no doubt explains part of the phenomenon at issue.  If it explains all of 
it, then there is no point in appealing to the idea that free will skepticism has a special moral 
status.   But I don't think it explains all of it.  I don't want to rule out the possibility that it is a 
complete explanation for some philosophers' actual practical seriousness about free will 
skepticism.  But I don't think it can be the whole story, because I don't think one has to hold 
that we know we lack free will in order to have good reason to be practically serious about 
free will skepticism but not these other kinds of skepticism.   
Objectors may continue in this vein.  They may point out that even those who don't 
hold that we can know we lack free will can still hold that we can be more confident about 
the truth of the claim that we lack free will than we can be about the truth of the claims that 
induction yields only falsehoods or that other minds do not exist.  Some might think that the 
scientific view of the world provides grounds for this view.  All science is evidence in favor 
of induction, in the sense that induction is the fabric of scientific evidence.  We also have 
some scientific evidence in favor of the existence of other minds, at least in the limited (but 
probably non-trivial) sense that a scientific study of the contents of my own skull would 
presumably show them to be of the same general kinds as the contents of other skulls.  But 
we have a growing body of scientific evidence against the claim that we have free will, in the 
sense that our gradually improving scientific understanding of the causes of our actions thus 
far gives no role to anything resembling the agent causation which many traditional 
6 
 
explanations of free will require.  Some might take these points to give us good enough 
grounds to regard free will skepticism with special seriousness.   
I will confess that I am not entirely unmoved by this sort of argument, but it is 
obviously controversial, and one must already lean toward incompatibilism and a fairly 
reductive variety of physicalism to find it very attractive.  Most free will theorists, including 
compatibilists, libertartians, and many free will skeptics, reject the notion that we need to find 
a role for traditional notions of agent causation in scientific explanations of action in order to 
make free will compatible with the scientific image of the world.  In this paper, I wish to 
present an account of practical seriousness about free will skepticism which will be of interest 
to everyone committed to maintaining or advancing H, not just those who are already 
convinced that we have good grounds for doubting that we have free will.  So, for purposes 
of this paper, I will not assume that free will skepticism has an epistemic status which 
induction and other minds skepticism lack.   
2. Skepticism and Commitment to Basic Moral Reasons 
As mentioned earlier, a moral reason is basic just in case all mainstream ethicists 
agree that we have it.  I won't be too precise about the boundaries of the mainstream, since I 
take the claims I'm making about it to be uncontroversial, but the mainstream, in the sense I 
intend, includes typical varieties of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, and no 
doubt lots of other views too.  Let me emphasize that I am not claiming that we ought to 
agree that we have basic moral reasons, or that we ought reflexively to defer to the views of 
mainstream ethicists.  My main interest in using the notion of basic moral reasons is simply 
to identify a category of reasons that happens to be important to a great many philosophers.  I 
readily concede that there are sensible philosophers who would not accept that we have the 
moral reasons I am calling basic—for example, philosophers who hold that there can be no 
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such things as moral reasons, because they hold that there are no moral facts which have the 
right sort of objectivity to ground reasons.  But anyone who does think that there are moral 
reasons should probably acknowledge that there are worse ways to proceed in lines of inquiry 
which bear on metaethics than by paying special attention to points of agreement among 
mainstream ethicists.   
The central example of a basic moral reason to be used in this paper is H (an 
extremely strong reason not to intentionally harm other people).  There are no doubt other 
basic moral reasons, for example, reasons to benefit others, as well as reasons to benefit and 
avoid harming ourselves, but these will not play central roles here.  We can accept that H 
exists without holding that it is never justified to intentionally harm another person—we need 
only hold that a reason even stronger than H is needed to justify harming someone.   
Philosophers who endorse different mainstream ethical theories explain H differently, 
and have different views about the conditions under which it is overridden (which I will refer 
to as H's 'overriding conditions').  But they agree that we have this reason.  Kantian 
deontologists explain it as an imperative to which we must conform unless in harming 
someone (e.g. by punishing him) we do not use him as a mere means.  Virtue ethicists might 
explain it as a principle followed by those who possess the virtue of justice except in cases 
where justice permits or requires harm.  Act-utilitarians explain H as derived from our reason 
to maximize overall happiness, and as overridden in some cases by that same reason.    
We can acknowledge these differences while at the same time recognizing a shared 
commitment to H.  That is, while these explanations of H and accounts of its overriding 
conditions are significantly different, I see no reason to think that the different frameworks 
which surround this reason in these different theories would give us reason to reject the claim 
that these different approaches to ethics do in fact agree on an extremely strong reason to 
avoid harming others.  It is important to note that the different views held by mainstream 
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ethicists about the conditions under which H can be overridden mean that none of the 
overriding conditions just mentioned are basic in the way that H is.  (It might turn out that 
there are other overriding conditions which are basic in the way that H is, for example, 
reasons of self-defense, but I will not investigate that here.) 
Some act-utilitarians may doubt the claim that there a strong reason not to 
intentionally harm others.
4
  They may suppose that since the only criterion for putting the act-
utilitarian seal of approval on any action is that it maximizes overall happiness, our reasons 
for harming people when it is a means to maximizing overall happiness are just as strong as 
our reasons for benefiting people when it is a means to maximizing overall happiness.  But 
this objection does not acknowledge the constraints under which we reason practically.  Act-
utilitarians need to be more confident about their ability to predict the consequences of 
actions to justify harming people than they do to justify benefiting people.  An action which 
does immediate harm can only improve overall utility through its consequences, while an 
action which immediately benefits people has an immediately positive impact on overall 
utility.  So when predictability is very limited, as it is under typical conditions for practical 
reasoning, there is a very strong reason to avoid intentionally harming others.  Therefore act-
utilitarians must acknowledge H along with other mainstream ethicists.   
As mentioned earlier, to be committed to a reason is to have resolved to reject the 
'downgrading' of it.  One accepts the downgrading of a reason when one accepts a theory 
change that (e.g.) undermines an existential commitment necessary to make the reason 
relevant to practical reasoning, weakens it, or increases the incidence of conditions under 
which it is overridden.  The main idea I want to explore in this paper is that practical 
seriousness about different kinds of skepticism has different implications for H and for 
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overriding conditions for H.  Practical seriousness about induction or other minds skepticism 
downgrades H, but practical seriousness about free will skepticism does not.  Instead, it 
downgrades the reason of retribution, which is a potential overrider of H. 
Ethicists who endorse retributivism (retributivists) hold that people can deserve to be 
harmed because of how they have acted.  Most retributivists are deontologists or virtue 
ethicists (though deontologists and virtue ethicists do not have to be retributivists).  For 
example, Kant holds that we can be harmed without being used as mere means if we deserve 
to be harmed, and many virtue ethicists hold that the just permit or require people to be 
harmed when they deserve to be harmed.  But no one can deserve to be harmed because of 
how he acted unless he acted with free will.  If we become practically serious about free will 
skepticism, then we have to accept that free will skepticism might be relevant to retributive 
reasoning.   
Utilitarians are never retributivists.  So it may seem that, in advocating practical 
seriousness about free will skepticism, despite its weakening of retributivism, I am inevitably 
advocating utilitarianism over deontology or virtue ethics.  But that is not my goal here.  
First, as just mentioned, retributivism is not an essential feature of either deontology or virtue 
ethics (as I'll explain in more detail later).  Second, insofar as I am advocating a positive view 
of ethics in this paper, it is that when we are in doubt about how to proceed, it makes sense to 
defer to basic reasons.  This view, on its own, does not advantage any variety of mainstream 
ethics over any other.  What it does is to elevate the importance of points of agreement 
among ethicists over the points of disagreement.  Since there is little agreement on overriding 
conditions for H, this view of ethics sees those overriding conditions as legitimately 
vulnerable in the process of theory change in a way that H itself is not. 
To develop these ideas in more detail, it will be helpful to consider the attitude of 
practical seriousness in a more fine-grained way.  So far I have described practical 
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seriousness as accepting that arguments for a particular kind of skepticism might be strong 
enough to be relevant for practical reasoning.  But there are various degrees of relevance to 
practical reasoning which we might accept to be possible.  We might become practically 
serious about a form of skepticism but remain relatively conservative about it, believing that 
our skepticism could require only the smallest possible changes in arguments about how we 
should act.  I will call this 'best-case practical seriousness'.  Alternatively, we might embrace 
a more radical agenda, and hold that skepticism about some claim C might be so serious that 
we ought never to assert C, in any way at all, in arguments about how we should act.  I will 
call this view 'worst-case practical seriousness'.  I take worst-case and best-case practical 
seriousness to be the boundaries of a continuum of attitudes, but I will mostly focus on 
boundary cases because they are clearer-cut.   
3. Worst-Case Practical Seriousness 
Worst-case practical seriousness means accepting that arguments for skepticism about 
some claim C might be strong enough to make it the case that we ought never to appeal to C, 
in any way at all, in arguments about how we should act.  Worst-case practical seriousness 
about other minds or induction skepticism is not compatible with a commitment to 
maintaining H, but worst-case practical seriousness about free will skepticism is.   
Suppose Yelena accepts H, and has always had an unskeptical view of other minds.  
But suppose she now becomes practically serious about worst-case other minds skepticism.  
Yelena now has to accept that she might never be entitled to assert the existence of other 
people, since it seems a safe bet that she cannot assert the existence of other people without 
also asserting the existence of other minds.  This diminishes the confidence with which she 
can make the existential commitment necessary for H to be relevant to her practical 
reasoning.  Yelena may legitimately remain just as confident about the truth of the 
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conditional claim that if other people exist, then H is relevant to her practical reasoning.  But 
since she holds that she may never be entitled to assert the antecedent, she must acknowledge 
that H may never be relevant to her practical reasoning.  So worst-case practical seriousness 
about other minds skepticism downgrades H. 
Next, suppose Ludwig accepts H, but now becomes practically serious about worst-
case induction skepticism.  He must now accept that it might never be legitimate to make 
claims involving the products of induction in practical reasoning.  This requires him to accept 
that it might not be legitimate to reason about means to ends in cases where claims about 
means include inductively-generated claims.  This would downgrade H, since many of the 
ways in which H can be relevant for practical reasoning depend on inductively-generated 
claims.  Before Ludwig's worries about induction skepticism, H required him not to wave 
pokers at interlocutors in order to emphasize points in his arguments, but now that he must 
question the induction-based claim that waving pokers at people is likely to cause them harm, 
he must question the relevance of H for this practice.  So worst-case practical seriousness 
about induction skepticism downgrades H. 
Things are different when we turn to worst-case practical seriousness about free will 
skepticism.  It clearly downgrades the retributivist reason for overriding H, since it 
undermines an existential commitment required by the retributivist reason.  That is, the 
retributivist reason implies the existence of free will, and practical seriousness about free will 
skepticism means accepting that we might never be able to legitimately assert the existence of 
free will.  But it does not downgrade H.   
It may be objected that downgrading the retributivist reason downgrades H indirectly.  
We might think this if we think H is more relevant for practical reasoning insofar as we 
believe that we can deserve to be harmed for failing to act in accordance with in.  But this 
confuses the moral reason H with a prudential reason to avoid harm.  It is not that H is any 
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stronger when backed by the threat of harm, but rather that a prudential reason constrains 
behavior along with H.  However we are to understand moral motivation, we must 
acknowledge that people are sometimes motivated to act morally even in cases where they 
can be certain to avoid harm if they act immorally.    
Some may think that even if refraining from making claims about free will does not 
indirectly downgrade H, it undermines too many moral theories that depend on claims about 
free will, and this constitutes an unacceptable impoverishment of the possibilities open to 
moral theory.  But this is a hard case to make.  Utilitarians need not appeal to free will, and 
there are also varieties of deontology and virtue ethics that do not require appeals to free will.      
It is probably obvious that utilitarians need not appeal to claims about free will.  
Utilitarians are concerned with treating people in utility-maximizing ways, not with 
responding to claims about how people deserve to be treated in light of their actions.  (Rule-
utilitarians might come up with rules which involved 'treating people as they deserved to be 
treated based on their actions', but these rules would have to be grounded in utility, not desert, 
so it would not matter in practice if such utilitarians acknowledged in theory that action-based 
desert was merely a useful fiction provided by, say, the peculiarities of human psychology.)  
One common way of explaining the significance of action-based desert is that it allows us to 
make backward-looking evaluations of how people should be treated.  But utilitarians are 
only interested in forward-looking evaluations. 
The complete dispensability of claims about free will for utilitarians also implies that 
worst-case free will skepticism is compatible with all basic moral reasons.  A reason cannot 
be basic unless it is acknowledged by utilitarians, since they must be counted among 
mainstream moral theorists.  So, since utilitarians do not acknowledge any moral reasons 
which include or entail claims about free will, there can be no basic moral reasons which 
include or entail claims about free will. 
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 In light of this point, it may seem that utilitarians could not become practically 
serious about free will skepticism (whether worst-case or best-case), since claims about free 
will are not relevant to the practical reasoning they endorse.  But we can be practically 
serious about a kind of skepticism so long as we take it to be relevant to practical reasoning 
that goes on in the actual world, even if it is not our own practical reasoning.  Since claims 
about free will do play a role in the practical reasoning endorsed by many ethical theorists 
that compete with utilitarians, utilitarians can become practically serious about free will 
skepticism, and becoming so gives them another way to argue for the dispensability of the 
backward-looking evaluations favored by those other theorists. 
Various writers have defended the view that there are varieties of virtue ethics that do 
not depend on free will or moral responsibility, including Derk Pereboom, Michael Slote, 
Gary Watson, and myself.
5
  To my mind, the key point is that we can recognize that someone 
possesses a virtue (a character trait which prompts them to virtuous thought and action) 
without supposing that they are praiseworthy for possessing that virtue, or for the way it 
prompts them to think and act.  In a parallel way, we can recognize a vice without supposing 
that the agent who has it is blameworthy for having it. 
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The view that deontology remains a live option if we cannot appeal to free will has 
also been advocated by various writers, including myself.
6
  It is popular to assume that it is 
essential to deontology to have a 'backward-looking' element derived from action-based 
desert.  But I think we can have a moral system which is robustly deontological without 
looking backward.  We need only look to the present, and to the people with whom we are 
interacting, to find a basis for desert-claims that (e.g.) constrain utility maximization.  To put 
the point in different words, personhood can provide a basis for desert-claims which is 
irreducibly different from action, and which does not depend upon free will in the way 
action-based desert does.  For example, all people deserve to be treated only as they would 
rationally consent to be treated, just because they are people.  Since no one can rationally 
consent to be treated as a mere means, it violates a legitimate personhood-based desert claim 
to treat someone as a mere means. 
Some may object that worst-case free will skepticism downgrades H in a very direct 
way that I have not yet mentioned, because of the 'ought implies can' principle.  That is, it 
may be objected that if we accept the 'ought implies can' principle, and we interpret this 'can' 
as entailing free will, then practical seriousness about worst-case free will skepticism 
downgrades all reasons for action which depend on this notion of 'ought' ('should', 'must', 
etc.), and H is clearly an example.  There are several ways in which we might handle the 
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'ought implies can' principle.  One way is simply to reject it.  This approach is endorsed by 
John Martin Fischer.  Fischer is a 'semicompatibilist'—he holds that moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism even if free will is not—and in the service of this view, he 
argues that 'ought' does not imply 'can'.
7
  If it is reasonable to see this strategy as available to 
a compatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility, then it seems reasonable to see it 
as equally available to skeptics about free will and moral responsibility.  But this strategy 
may be unnecessarily radical.   
A more conservative approach is to interpret the 'can' in such a way that it does not 
entail free will.  One way to do this is with an epistemic interpretation of 'can': that is, to say 
that I can do x is to say that, to the best of my knowledge, it is possible for me to do x.  On 
this interpretation of 'can', it remains true that we can do a variety of things at any given point 
in the future, no matter what metaphysics of agency we accept, so long as we make 
reasonable assumptions about what we can know about the future.  Suppose I hold that 
determinism is true, and that it implies that it is possible for me to act in only one particular 
way at any given point in the future.  So long as I cannot predict what that one particular way 
is, it remains true, on this epistemic interpretation of 'can', that I can act in more than one 
way.  Even if determinism is in fact true, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that we will ever 
be able to predict how we will act in any detail, given the vast number of variables that would 
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presumably have to be measured.  Absent this knowledge, there will always be multiple 
things that I can do, in this sense.
8
 
My claim here is that there are at least two senses of 'can' that our conceptual toolkit 
must contain if we are to work in this region of ethics.  The epistemic sense of 'can' is about 
the kinds of possibilities of action agents need to have for 'oughts' to figure in their practical 
reasoning.  The free-will entailing sense of 'can' is about the kinds of possibilities of action 
agents need to have for it to be appropriate to hold agents morally responsible for acting (or 
failing to act) in accordance with 'oughts'.  Some may object to this multiplying of senses of 
'can', but it seems clear there are many different 'cans' involved in ordinary language as well 
as philosophical theorizing, so this should not be an objection.  (For example, if I claim that 
my adjustable Crescent wrench can fit fasteners of an infinite variety of widths, I seem to be 
using a 'can' that need not be connected to claims about knowledge of the actual future or  
moral responsibility.)  If we accept the epistemic sense of 'can', then it follows that we need 
not interpret the 'ought implies can' principle in such a way that H is downgraded by practical 
seriousness about worst-case free will skepticism.   
Philosophers who hold what we might call a realist view of 'ought implies can' may 
insist that the truth about what I ought to do is conditioned only by the possibilities that are 
actually open to me in the future, not by what I happen to know about those possibilities.  
(Libertarians are typically realists in this sense, but so are compatibilists who advocate 
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descendants of the Humean 'conditional analysis' of 'could have done otherwise'.
9
)  On this 
realist view, 'oughts' and 'cans' are ontologically prior, as it were, to our reasoning about 
them.  If the reason that I can consistently believe that I can act in some way in the future is 
merely that I lack knowledge of facts which imply that I cannot act in that way, then my 
belief about this 'can', though consistent, is false.  Since my belief about 'can' is false, my 
corresponding belief about 'ought', though consistent, is false.  It is not really the case that I 
ought to act in that way.   
Even if we accept such realism about 'oughts', we can hold that what matters for 
practical reasoning is what agents can consistently believe about 'ought' claims, not truths 
about 'ought'-claims that they cannot actually know.  But it is far from obvious that such 
realism is necessary for 'oughts' and 'cans' to have the sort of objectivity required for practical 
reasoning.  In the Kantian tradition, for example, 'oughts' are understood as commands which 
reason gives to itself—so 'oughts' cannot be ontologically prior to reasoning about them.  If 
we understand 'oughts' in this way, then it may become more plausible to suppose that the 
truth about the 'can' in the 'ought implies can' principle is conditioned by the knowledge about 
the future to which reason happens to have access.  This was not Kant's own view, but it is a 
view which seems open to contemporary metaethicists working in the Kantian tradition. 
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 For descendants of the 'conditional analysis', see J.K. Campbell, 'A Compatibilist 
Theory of Alternative Possibilities', Philosophical Studies, 88, 3 (1997), pp. 319-330, and 
'Compatibilist Alternatives', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35, 3 (2005), pp. 387-406, and 
also K. Vihvelin, 'Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account', Philosophical Topics, 32 
(2004), pp. 427-450. 
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It may strike some readers as odd, or even disingenuous, for a paper which advocates 
skepticism about the 'can' of free will to be so unskeptical about the 'can' in the 'ought implies 
can' principle.  But the motivation for splitting the difference in this way flows directly from 
the metaethical outlook I am advocating here.  That is, all mainstream moral theories would 
appear to include 'oughts', so 'oughts' are basic moral reasons.  But not all mainstream moral 
theories include the action-based desert-claims that derive from free will and moral 
responsibility.  So we can split the difference in this way even if we are committed to 
maintaining basic moral reasons.  And given that some of the most damaging harm in our 
current practices is justified by making claims about free will, philosophers inclined to 
advance H have a very good reason to take this approach.   
This approach may still seem wanting to some readers.  I think it is fair to say that this 
is a coherent account of how we can endorse 'oughts' even if we become practically serious 
about worst-case free will skepticism.  But no matter how sympathetic some readers may be 
to the goal of advancing H, they may find epistemic analyses of the 'can' in 'ought implies 
can' to be too weak.  However, as mentioned earlier, there are degrees of practical seriousness 
about free will skepticism which we might accept.  Readers who would like to be skeptical 
enough about free will to advance H, but not so skeptical that they have to worry about the 
'can' in the 'ought implies can' principle, might do well to consider best-case practical 
seriousness about free will skepticism as an alternative.     
4. Best-Case Practical Seriousness 
Suppose we accept that the arguments for skepticism about some claim C might be 
strong enough to make it the case that we sometimes ought to refrain from asserting C when 
deliberating about how to act, but only in cases where it is appropriate to apply the highest 
practical justificatory standard.  This view is what I mean by 'best-case practical seriousness'.  
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Best-case practical seriousness about free will skepticism might appeal to 
philosophers who think that arguments for free will skepticism might be strong enough to 
undermine retributive arguments for overriding H, but could not be strong enough to 
undermine justifications of praise, and could not be strong enough to undermine the 'can' in 
the 'ought implies can' principle, even if this 'can' entails free will.  This is because it seems 
natural to suppose that we must meet a higher justificatory standard to appeal to claims about 
free will when we seek to override H than when we seek to justify praise, or to defend the 
existence of moral reasons involving 'oughts'.  It is widely agreed that arguments for 
overriding H must be held to the highest justificatory standard, at least in cases where serious 
harm is at issue, and I think this view is correct.  To speak impressionistically, I think there is 
a strong intuition that there is a sort of 'sliding scale' built into H, according to which the 
extremely strong reason not to intentionally harm others gets stronger as the harm at issue 
becomes more severe, in such a way that arguments for doing serious intentional harm to 
others are subject to the highest standard of practical justification.  I take there to be the same 
sort of basic agreement about this point that there is about H itself.
10
  I will not try to define 
precisely how high the highest practical justificatory standard is, since I think it is clear 
enough that whatever its precise height may be, it is the right standard to apply to arguments 
                                                 
10
 Act-utilitarians may object to the claim that arguments for seriously harming people 
have to be held to an especially high standard.  But as explained earlier, under the conditions 
of limited predictability in which we reason practically, act-utilitarians have a strong reason 
to avoid intentionally inflicting harm as a means to the end of maximizing happiness, because 
the immediate effect of this means is to reduce overall happiness.  As the harm at issue 
becomes more severe, act-utilitarians must raise the justificatory standard they apply to 
arguments for inflicting it.   
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for doing serious intentional harm to others.  (It is probably not as high as certainty, which is 
arguably an appropriate standard for arguments about mathematics and logic, but which is 
probably not appropriate in the messy empirical contexts in which we must reason about how 
to act.  I suspect that the 'beyond reasonable doubt' standard applied in the criminal 
courtroom is about as precise an articulation of this standard as philosophers can hope to 
find.
11
)   
If this is right, then best-case practical seriousness includes accepting that arguments 
for skepticism about some claim C might be strong enough that we ought not assert C in 
arguments for overriding H, at least where serious harm is at issue.  Based on this conclusion, 
I will now argue that even best-case practical seriousness about other minds or induction 
skepticism downgrades H.     
Suppose that Al, Bernie, Connie, and Dev are the sole members of an island 
shipwreck society.  Al murders Bernie in cold blood with some means that Al could be 
confident (skepticism about induction aside) would more than suffice to kill Bernie (say 
stabbing Bernie 50 times).  Suppose that Connie and Dev have Al in custody afterwards, and 
they are debating about how to treat him.  Suppose Connie argues for overriding H: 'Al 
deserves to suffer serious harm for injuring a person in a way that Al should have expected to 
cause that person to suffer and die.  We have a reason to inflict serious harm on those who 
deserve it, and this reason is stronger than H.  So we ought to inflict serious harm on Al.'   
                                                 
11
 Pereboom suggests applying the 'reasonable doubt' standard in Living Without Free 
Will (p. 161).  I discuss this issue in more detail in B. Vilhauer, 'Free Will and Reasonable 
Doubt', American Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 2 (2009), pp. 131-140. 
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Now consider three ways in which Dev might reply in defense of Al, by appealing to 
skepticism about other minds, induction, or free will.  First, suppose Dev is practically 
serious about other minds skepticism.  He might challenge Connie's argument as follows: 'We 
don't know that other minds exist, so it might not be legitimate to appeal to the existence of 
other minds in arguments that have to meet the standard appropriate for overriding H.  Al 
could only deserve serious harm if Bernie was a person, but Bernie could not have been a 
person unless he had a mind, so if it might be illegitimate to appeal to claim that Bernie had a 
mind, it might be illegitimate to appeal to the claim that Bernie was a person.'  But upon 
inspection, Dev's argument begins to unravel in a way that makes its upshot unclear.  There 
are at least two problems with Dev's argument.  First, it works by claiming that H is so strong 
that we cannot assume that the existential conditions necessary for H to be practically 
relevant are fulfilled when making arguments for overriding H—it claims that the relevance 
of H in the context of Al's relation to Bernie is not clear enough for Connie and Dev to appeal 
to it in an attempt to override H.  So whatever work it does to support H in one context, it 
accomplishes only by downgrading H elsewhere.  The second problem is that if Connie and 
Dev reflect on the first problem, then it would be natural for them to ask why, if H now looks 
oddly weak in the context of Al's relation to Bernie, they are obligated to hold arguments for 
overriding H to such a high standard in the context of their relation to Al.  To ask this would 
be to downgrade H in the latter context too. 
If Dev instead appeals to induction skepticism, then he ends up in a similar situation.  
Suppose Dev argues as follows: 'We don't have knowledge about the products of induction, 
so it might not be legitimate to appeal to them in arguments that have to meet the standard 
appropriate for overriding H.  So it might not be legitimate to claim that Al should have 
expected the stabbing to cause Bernie to suffer and die, because expectations about the 
effects of stabbings are products of induction.'  Once again, this move seeks to block the 
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argument for overriding H in the context of Connie's and Dev's relation to Al by downgrading 
H in the context of Al's relation to Bernie.  And once again, if Connie and Dev reflect on this, 
it would be natural for them to ask why they should be so sure about the strength of H in the 
context of their relation to Al, which would downgrade H in this context as well.   
Things are different if Dev appeals to free will skepticism.  Suppose Dev argues that 
we don't know we have free will, so it might not be legitimate to appeal to the claim that free 
will exists in arguments for overriding H—and since we can only claim that Al deserves to 
suffer for his action if we can claim that he acted with free will, it therefore might not be 
legitimate to claim that he deserves to suffer for his action.  The upshot is that Connie's 
argument for overriding H is challenged without presenting H as downgraded.   
5. Advancing the Basic Reason Not to Intentionally Harm 
Thus far I have argued that a commitment to maintaining H is compatible with 
practical seriousness about free will skepticism, but not other minds skepticism or induction 
skepticism.  However, as is probably obvious, a commitment to maintaining H is also 
compatible with rejecting practical seriousness about free will skepticism.  So, on its own, a 
commitment to maintaining H does not give us a reason to become practically serious about 
free will skepticism.  At best it gives those committed to maintaining H a reason not to regard 
it as problem if they suddenly find themselves practically serious about it.   
However, there is an attitude toward H which I think does provide a reason to become 
practically serious about free will skepticism, which (as mentioned earlier) I will call the 
inclination to advance H.  While commitment to maintaining a reason is a resolution to reject 
claims that downgrade that reason, to be inclined to advance a reason is to be inclined to 
accept, all other things being equal, claims that upgrade it (e.g. claims that strengthen it, 
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buttress the existential commitments presupposed by it, or diminish the incidence of its being 
overridden by other reasons).   
People inclined to advance H have a reason to become practically serious about free 
will skepticism because of the way it downgrades the retributive reason for overriding H.  
That is, downgrading the retributive reason for overriding H upgrades H, because it 
diminishes the incidence of H's being overridden.    
People inclined to advance H probably have better reason to be practically serious 
about best-case free will skepticism than about worst-case free will skepticism.  This is 
because practical seriousness about best-case free will skepticism targets arguments for 
harming others in a way that practical seriousness about worst-case free will skepticism does 
not.  As explained in the last section, practical seriousness about best-case free will 
skepticism only requires us to recognize the possibility that it might be illegitimate to appeal 
to free will in arguments that must meet the highest justificatory standard, and this effectively 
targets arguments for doing serious intentional harm.  But practical seriousness about worst-
case free will skepticism requires us to recognize the possibility that it might not be 
legitimate to appeal to free will at all, even in the context of praise that benefits some people 
and harms no one, and in the context of defending the existence of 'ought'-based moral 
reasons against objections drawn from the 'ought implies can' principle.  Worst-case free will 
skepticism is compatible with an inclination to advance H, for the same reasons that it is 
compatible with a commitment to maintaining H, but worst-case practical seriousness is not 
as well-tailored to the needs of philosophers interested in advancing H as best-case practical 
seriousness is.  Philosophers inclined to advance H might find the best fit of all in an attitude 
somewhere between worst-case and best-case free will skepticism, since there may be 
arguments for intentionally harming others in ways that are not serious, which need not meet 
the highest justificatory standard, but which must meet a higher justificatory standard than 
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arguments for praise that benefits some people and harms no one.  But I will not try to 
describe that attitude more precisely here. 
I will not claim that anyone should be inclined to advance H, only that it strikes me as 
a sensible and natural attitude for philosophers to take.  As probably goes without saying, 
many philosophers choose a goal to pursue through argumentation, and hope that their own 
small contributions to theory change will help to achieve that goal.  This approach to 
philosophy is not obligatory—one can certainly hope to be driven to one's conclusions by the 
sheer force of argument alone, without choosing a goal at which one hopes to arrive.  But it 
seems fair to say that such goal-oriented philosophizing is as common in the discipline as 
philosophizing that eschews goals.  It seems to me that the goal of advancing H is as sensible 
a goal as any other, and more sensible than many, given H's status as a basic moral reason.      
6. Non-Retributive Reasons for Overriding H 
We can be committed to maintaining H, or inclined to advance H, even if we do not 
hold the arguably over-optimistic view that there are never good reasons for overriding H.  It 
may be that, given human nature, we cannot keep society functioning without both an 
institution of punishment and also a moral psychology that includes painful moral emotions 
(like guilt) which help regulate behavior.  Those inclined to advance H should advocate less 
harmful ways of achieving these goals.  Non-retributive moral theories provide a variety of 
explanations of how we can justify overriding H enough to keep society functioning.  I lack 
the space to give a complete account of these explanations, but let me briefly sketch a few.   
Act-utilitarianism provides one obvious example—it has no trouble justifying the 
imposition of harm in a way that minimizes overall harm, whether the harm comes in the 
form of self-regulating emotion or punishment.  But philosophers committed to advancing H 
should be cautious about accepting act-utilitarianism.  Since act-utilitarianism can sometimes 
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recommend punishments of terrible severity as means to overall harm minimization, act-
utilitarianism does nothing to reduce the amount of harm we can justifiably inflict on 
individuals.  The suffering of a few vivisected pickpockets may in some circumstances be 
outweighed in the act-utilitarian calculus by all the suffering prevented through deterring 
crime. 
However, the deontological approach mentioned earlier, which appeals to 
personhood-based desert instead of action-based desert, can generate a justification of 
punishment which constrains utility maximization.
12
  It holds that simply because we are 
persons, we deserve to be treated only as we would rationally consent to be treated.  It is 
popular to explain rational consent in terms of Rawlsian original position deliberation.  
Suppose that we had to choose institutions of punishment behind the veil of ignorance, 
assuming that we had an equal chance of finding ourselves among the punished or among 
those protected by the institution of punishment.  It would be rational to choose to imprison 
violent criminals in benign prisons (prisons much less harmful than contemporary ones).  For 
people with normal social attachments, and a normal desire to be free from interference in the 
pursuit of their ends, prison would inevitably be harmful, even under benign conditions.
13
  
But it would make sense to risk that harm if it significantly diminished our chances of being 
murdered or seriously injured by a violent criminal.  If we chose penal institutions in this 
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 I discuss this in more detail in 'Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism'. 
13
 Smilansky argues that free will skeptics who are concerned about justice cannot justify 
punishing in a way that deters, but I think that even benign imprisonment is harmful enough 
to deter.  See  S. Smilansky, 'Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio', Law 
and Philosophy, 30, 1 (2011), pp. 352-367. 
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way, we would probably not choose to incarcerate non-violent criminals—we would 
probably be content with a system of fines and community service.  But I doubt that we need 
to incarcerate non-violent criminals to keep society functioning.   
To keep society functioning, outward penal institutions may need to be supplemented 
by inward experiences of painful moral emotions like guilt, which help regulate behavior.  
We can appeal to a non-retributive virtue ethics to explain the appropriateness of such 
emotional experiences.   
Painful moral emotions are often understood on the model of retributive punishment.  
That is, they are often understood as ways in which agents who have acted immorally impose 
deserved suffering upon themselves.  (This model goes back at least to Freud.
14
)  On this 
model, encouraging others to feel painful moral emotions is a way of exacting indirect 
retribution, by prompting the targets of retribution to exact retribution upon themselves.  This 
model is probably accurate for many people's experiences of painful moral emotions in 
contemporary society, in the sense that many people do believe they deserve to suffer painful 
emotions for their immoral actions, and they may successfully cause themselves to 
experience painful emotions based on this belief.  But this model is not necessary or helpful 
for understanding all painful moral emotions.   For example, even in contemporary society, 
there is a kind of remorse which is based on an emotional attachment to the victim which the 
wrongdoer forms in the wake of the wrongful act, which prompts the wrongdoer to suffer 
empathically along with the person he has wronged.
15
  In other words, in this kind of 
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 See e.g. S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: Norton, 1989), pp 83-96. 
15
 I discuss this in more detail in 'Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics', Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 42, 4 (2004), pp. 547-564. 
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remorse, the wrongdoer's suffering derives from the fact that he comes to care about the 
victim in the wake of the wrongful act.  In my view, the explanation of why wrongdoers 
suffer in cases like this need not be fundamentally different from the explanation of why we 
suffer when our friends or loved ones suffer.  This is part of what it means to be attached to 
others, and insofar as such attachment is virtuous, we can recognize empathic remorse as 
virtuous.  What makes empathic remorse different from friendship or love is that the 
wrongdoer can recognize that the victim's suffering was caused by his actions, and that such 
suffering can be prevented in the future if he acts differently.  I see no reason why this sort of 
remorse may not play just as effective a role in regulating behavior as other kinds of painful 
moral emotions.  If this is right, then it seems plausible to claim that it would be virtuous to 
encourage agents to feel this sort of remorse when they have reason to do so.  This would 
imply that a non-retributive virtue ethics can provide grounds for overriding H in 
encouraging others to feel painful moral emotions that help regulate behavior. 
7. Conclusion 
If the arguments I have presented here are correct, then philosophers committed to 
maintaining or advancing H can be practically serious about free will skepticism, but not 
induction or other minds skepticism, and philosophers inclined to advance H have good 
reason to be practically serious about free will skepticism.  Are there other canonical 
philosophical skepticisms which are similar to free will skepticism in this respect?  
Skepticism about personal identity over time seems to be a likely candidate.  Even worst-case 
personal identity skepticism seems compatible with a commitment to H.  That is, we can 
question claims about personal identity without questioning the more fundamental claim that 
persons exist, and it is this more fundamental claim upon which H depends.  Best-case 
personal identity skepticism would target arguments for the retributive justification of serious 
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harm without doing anything to downgrade H.  If we cannot appeal to the claim that the 
current target of retributive harm is the same person as the earlier agent of the action for 
which punishment is proposed, then we cannot retributively justify harm.  But questioning 
the identity of the target does nothing to downgrade H, since we can question whether the 
target of retribution is the same person as the earlier agent without suggesting that the force 
of H on the earlier agent was any weaker than a non-skeptic would have taken it to be.  If this 
is right, then philosophers inclined to advance H have good reason to be practically serious 
about personal identity skepticism as well.   
